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Christopher Kent, Kylie Smith and James Holloway 
1.  Introduction 
The past 25 years has been an era of significant reforms affecting the institutional 
features and operation of monetary and fiscal policies, as well as of product and 
labour markets across a range of industrialised countries. Over the same period, 
there has also been a considerable decline in the volatility of real output around the 
developed world. Figure  1 shows that, on average, across 20  selected OECD 
countries,1 the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP has fallen by 
more than 1 percentage point since the 1970s. Not surprisingly, there is a growing 
literature seeking to disentangle the varied (and interrelated) causes of this general 
decline, and to determine the explanatory role, if any, for structural reforms. 
Four factors that could explain the decline in the volatility of GDP have been 
proposed: changes in both the composition of GDP and the behaviour of its various 
components; the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies; structural reforms in 
markets; and plain good luck, reflecting smaller and/or less frequent shocks.2 
Explanations related to the first three factors typically emphasise their role in 
reducing the responsiveness of an economy to exogenous shocks. In addition, these 
factors may have had some role in directly reducing the magnitude of shocks 
themselves. The fourth factor, good luck, may have led to a decline in the 
magnitude of the shocks globally over this period, regardless of any effect from the 
first three factors. The relative contribution of these four factors to the decline in 
output volatility is important since it has implications for future output volatility. 
 
                                           
1  These are: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan; the 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; and the United 
States. 
2  See Bernanke (2004) and Stock and Watson (2004) for discussions of the literature. A fifth factor that has 
received attention is the possibility of a reduction in measurement error, though at least for the United States, this 
has been discounted (see Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel 2005 for a discussion).  2 
Figure 1: Average Output Volatility – 20 Selected OECD Countries 
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Sources:  ABS; Thomson Financial; World Bank World Development Indicators 
By their nature, the first three structural factors are likely to have a more 
permanent effect on output volatility, while a decline in global shocks (irrespective 
of structural factors) may only be temporary. 
Surprisingly, there has been little consensus regarding the relative contribution of 
these four factors to the reduction in output volatility. A variety of approaches have 
been used to determine their empirical relevance. One approach examines changes 
in the make-up and behaviour of various components of GDP for a given country. 
A second approach examines the effectiveness of monetary policy as a tool of 
macroeconomic stabilisation. For example, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and 
Krause (2004) estimate movements towards an efficiency frontier for inflation and 
output variability and movements in the frontier itself (by using estimates of 
simple structural equations for aggregate demand and supply). They find that better 
monetary policy (that is, a move towards the efficient frontier) accounts for most 
of the improvement in macroeconomic stability across a wide range of countries. 
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A third approach also uses estimates of structural models for given countries, but 
with the aim of decomposing changes in output volatility into two parts, that which 
is due to changes in the magnitude of shocks and that which is due to changes in 
the transmission of shocks (that is, model parameters). Changes in transmission are 
taken to reflect structural change, broadly defined to incorporate behavioural 
changes, the efficacy of macro-policies and structural reforms in markets. In stark 
contrast to the results of the aforementioned studies, Ahmed, Levin and 
Wilson (2004) and Stock and Watson (2004) find that most of the decline in output 
volatility in the United States is due to a decline in the magnitude and frequency of 
global shocks. For Australia, Simon (2001) also finds that most of the decline in 
output volatility is due to smaller shocks, with little role for structural factors. 
However, this approach implicitly assumes that shocks are independent of the 
structure of the economy. Simon acknowledges this limitation, noting that the 
decline in productivity shocks may have been related to structural factors, such as 
the shift towards more skilled workers and serviced-based industries, and financial 
liberalisation. Similarly, Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler  (2000) argue that monetary 
policy (by better anchoring expectations) can reduce shocks arising from shifts in 
expectations for reasons unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals. 
A fourth, atheoretic, approach is based on cross-country panel data models with 
output volatility as the dependent variable and various measures of structural 
change as independent variables. Implicitly, coefficient estimates on these 
measures of structural change will jointly capture their effect on the responsiveness 
of an economy to shocks and the size of those shocks. Using G7 panel data, Barrell 
and Gottschalk (2004) find a significant role for indirect measures of monetary 
policy effectiveness and regulatory reform in explaining the decline in output 
volatility. 
The aim of this paper is to re-examine the significance of a wide range of variables 
in explaining the decline in output volatility using this atheoretic approach, though 
with a few notable innovations. First, we use a larger panel (with 20  OECD 
countries). Second, we use direct measures of structural reforms which are less 
likely to suffer from possible endogeneity. Specifically, for monetary policy we 
construct a crude, but apparently effective, dummy variable that identifies two 
possible types of regimes according to the relative strictness with which policy-
makers pursue the goals of low and stable inflation. For product markets we use a 
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￿synthetic￿ indicator which allows a comparison of regulatory frameworks across 
countries and over time (Nicoletti et al 2001). Third, unlike existing studies of this 
type, we show that our results are relatively robust to trends in common global 
shocks that are unrelated to structural change.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section  2 provides a more detailed 
discussion of the mechanisms linking output volatility to the explanatory factors 
identified above; paying particular attention to the role of product and labour 
market reforms, which have received less attention in the literature. Section  3 
describes the data in detail, and outlines the basic estimation methodology. Section 
4 presents the results, considers an extension that controls for trends in common 
shocks, and provides a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Explanations for Declining Output Volatility 
This section considers the mechanisms that could link output volatility to changes 
in monetary and fiscal policy, structural reforms in labour and product markets, 
and changes in the composition and behaviour of components of GDP. It also takes 
a preliminary look at some relevant trends in the data for 20  OECD countries 
(hereafter referred to simply as OECD countries) from the late 1970s to 2003.  
2.1  Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
The rise of monetary and fiscal policies as stabilisation tools in the post-World 
War II era was one of the earliest, and still prominent, reasons cited for the decline 
in output volatility in a number of countries. Blanchard and Simon (2001) and 
Romer  (1999) find that monetary policy rather than fiscal policy has made the 
larger contribution to stabilising economic downturns. One explanation for this is 
that monetary authorities have actively counteracted some post-war shocks, such as 
the 1987 stock market crash, while fiscal policy, though effective, has had a more 
passive role (largely through the operation of the automatic stabilisers) in 
moderating business cycle fluctuations. The tendency across many countries in the 
past couple of decades for greater central bank independence and the adoption of 
monetary policy regimes that are stricter on inflation appears to have resulted in 
the widespread decline in inflation volatility. This is consistent with a reduction in 
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the volatility of output in the case of demand shocks, since these push output and 
inflation in the same direction. And while supply shocks push inflation and output 
in opposite directions, output volatility may still decline under a more credible 
monetary policy regime if it helps to better anchor inflationary expectations. A 
number of papers using panel data have established a close link between the 
decline in inflation volatility and output volatility (Barrell and Gottschalk 2004, 
and Blanchard and Simon  2001, for example). This is readily apparent in our 
sample of OECD countries (Figure 2; summary statistics by country are available 
in Table 1 and in Figure B1 in Appendix B).3 Interpreting this to imply causation 
is, however, made difficult by the problem of endogeneity, as inflation and output 
volatility are likely to be affected by common shocks. Hence, we argue that there is 
a need to capture changes in monetary policy regimes with a more direct measure 
that is not likely to be affected by output volatility (see Section 3). 
Figure 2: Change in Inflation Volatility versus Output Volatility – 1983–2003 
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Sources:  ABS; Thomson Financial; World Bank World Development Indicators 
                                           
3  See Section 3 for a description of the calculations underpinning this and other scatter plots. The start and end 
dates correspond to those used in the regression analysis later in the paper. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued next page) 
  GDP volatility
(a)   Product  market
regulation






(d)  Days lost to labour disputes
(e) 
  1978  1983  2003    1978  1998  Strict inflation regime    1978  1983  2003  1978  1983  2003 
Australia            1.0 2.4 0.6 4.5 1.6 1993￿ 3.0 2.9 0.3 580 481 49
Austria       
                       
       
           
       
       
                        
     
2.8 1.9 1.2   5.2 3.2 1995￿   2.4 1.5 0.8 1 1 65
Belgium 2.8 1.9 1.4 5.5 3.1 1979￿ 3.6 1.6 0.6      197    109    15
Canada 1.2 2.7 1.7   4.2 2.4 1992￿   1.6 2.5 0.4 853 651 146
Denmark 3.3 2.2 1.0 5.6 2.9 1979￿ 2.5 2.1 0.3 72 98 39
Finland 1.3 1.9 1.5   5.6 2.6 1994￿   3.9 2.0 1.0 400 294 41
France 1.7 0.9 1.5   6.0 3.9 1979￿   1.9 1.7 0.6 167 101 77
Germany 2.6 1.9 1.3 5.2 2.4 Always  strict 1.7 3.1 0.5     48    6    3 
  Ireland 2.7 2.1 3.1   5.7 4.0 1979￿   5.1 4.0 1.5 487 526 58
Italy       
               
3.3 2.0  1.2   5.8 4.3 1979￿1992; 1999
   
  2.7 2.8 0.4 993 848 90
Japan 2.5  2.1  1.1   5.2 2.9 Always strict   7.2 2.3 0.3      91    13    1
Netherlands          1.9 1.5 2.0 5.3 3.0 1979￿ 2.6 1.7 1.0 10 24 11 
New Zealand  3.7 1.5  0.8    5.1 1.4 1990￿   2.2 3.9 1.2 229 241 16 
Norway 1.4                      
                       
                 
           
                         
2.6 1.1 5.0 2.5 2000￿ 1.3 3.4 0.7      64    44    58
Portugal 4.4 1.8 2.1 5.9 4.1 1992￿ 4.2 3.3 0.8      128    145    12
Spain 2.0  2.3  1.0   4.7 3.2 1989￿   3.5 1.4 0.5      705    629    162
Sweden 1.8 1.0 1.7 4.5 2.2 1995￿ 0.7 2.7 0.8 30 225 34
Switzerland 3.8 1.4 1.5 4.5 3.9 Always  strict 3.9 1.5 0.4     2    1    3 
UK 2.1 2.2  0.8   
     
                        
  4.3 1.0 1990￿   5.7 5.0 0.7 351 441 22
US 3.0 2.5  1.5   4.0 1.4 1979￿   2.1 4.1 0.7 396 170 41
Average 2.5 1.9 1.4 5.1 2.8 3.1 2.7 0.7     290    252    47
Notes:  Annual data from 1973 to 2003. Standard deviations and averages are taken over 5-year periods ending in the dates shown. 
(a)  Standard deviation of annual growth rate over a 5-year window. 
(b)  Averages of indicators on regulatory and market environment for seven energy and service industries, see Nicoletti et al (2001); scale 0￿6 from least to most restrictive. 
(c)  Year country adopted a strict policy towards inflation. 
(d)  Standard deviation of the annual growth rate of the CPI deflator over a 5-year window. 
(e)  Number of working days lost due to industrial disputes divided by total employment, times 1 000; five-year average.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
  Openness
(f)      Financial  liberalisation
(g) Oil price volatility
(h) Government  balance
volatility
(i) 
GDP less change in 
inventory volatility
(a) 
                            1978  1983  2003   1978 1983 2003 1978 1983 2003 1978 1983 2003 1978 1983 2003
Australia        29 32    42    45 53 117 1.2 0.4 1.1 2.6 1.9 0.7
Austria         
                       
     
       
         
         
                       
     
                 
              
64 72  100     58 75 104 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.4
Belgium   110    127    161      24
   
    29    78   0.7 2.2 0.3   1.7 1.2 1.5
Canada 47 51  80     96 105 139 2.0 1.2 1.6 2.6 3.3 1.7
Denmark 60 68    80    159 134 139 2.0 1.4 0.8 2.6 1.9 1.1
Finland 53 61  70     45 43 58 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.0 0.6 1.3
France 32 36  43     49 70 73 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.4
Germany   38    43    55      66
   
    75    119 0.9 1.9 1.0   2.0 1.6 1.6
Ireland 96 104  170     27 36 110 ￿ 2.8 2.1 4.8 2.5 3.6
Italy       46 44   53         81    62    79   1.2 2.0  0.8   1.1  1.8  1.8
Japan   25    27    20      85    87    110     1.3 1.0  0.6   2.9  1.3  0.9
Netherlands      96 106    122      41 58 143 ￿ 1.5 0.8 0.6 1.2 2.2
New Zealand  54 60    64     18 21 121   ￿ ￿ 0.6 4.0 2.7 0.8 
Norway   78    78    72      53    52    100                  
                     
               
         
     
    ￿ 1.0 2.2   1.4 2.8 1.1
Portugal   50    64    70      77    80    141   2.3 2.9 1.3   0.8 0.8 2.1
Spain   30    35    59      80    78    105     ￿ 1.0  0.5   1.6  0.9  1.0
Sweden 55 61  83     40 40 44 ￿ 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.7 1.7
Switzerland 62 69    82      89 115 160 ￿ ￿ ￿ 3.2 1.9 1.5
UK           
           
                    
43 41  41   43 48 117 0.7 1.8 2.3 1.4 1.9 0.8
US 17 19  24   99 103 143 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.4
Average   54    60    75      64    68    110   113.6  57.5 28.1 1.3 1.4 1.3   2.1 1.6 1.5
(f)  The value of total trade as a per cent to GDP; 5-year average. 
(g)  Total credit as a per cent to GDP; 5-year average. 
(h)  Standard deviation of the annual growth rate of West Texas Intermediate crude oil price over a 5-year window; measured in SDRs per barrel. 
(i)  Standard deviation of annual cyclically-adjusted government fiscal balance as a per cent to GDP over a 5-year window. 
Sources: See  Appendix  B   8
In principle, discretionary fiscal policy can be an effective tool for aggregate 
demand management if government spending and taxes are sizeable enough that 
modest variations may work to offset other cyclical impulses. In practice, fiscal 
policy may not move quickly enough to be countercyclical, and timing difficulties 
could actually lead fiscal policies to exacerbate output fluctuations. Perotti (2005), 
using structural VAR models for Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US, 
finds that the magnitude of fiscal shocks declined around the early 1980s and that 
the transmission of these shocks has become more muted over time. 
For OECD countries (on average and across countries) the relative size of the 
public sector (measured, for example, by public consumption as a share of GDP) 
has been generally stable since the late 1970s (at around 20 per cent). The volatility 
of discretionary policy (measured by the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance, as a 
share of GDP) has not changed significantly over this period, although it has 
tended to rise in those countries which experienced larger declines in output 
volatility (Table 1 and Figure 3). However, interpreting this to imply something 
about causation is difficult; output volatility may have fallen in these countries due 
in part to more active discretionary fiscal policy working to dampen other cyclical 
influences, or in spite of it. Nevertheless, such a measure may provide a useful 
control for regression analysis.  
Romer (1999) concludes that non-discretionary fiscal policy has played the larger 
role in moderating the fluctuations of business cycles, consistent with the post-war 
growth of a number of automatic stabilisers, including income tax, unemployment 
compensation and welfare programs. While this may be true, it would be difficult 
to establish without the aid of a structural model to identify shocks. Changes in the 
volatility of the non-discretionary fiscal balance (as a ratio to GDP) show no clear 
long-run trend across countries in our sample.4 
 
                                           
4  The non-discretionary fiscal balance (as a ratio to GDP) is measured as the difference between the primary fiscal 
balance and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance.  9 
Figure 3: Change in Fiscal Policy Volatility versus Output Volatility –  
1983–2003 









































Change in volatility of cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance – % pts  
Note:  New Zealand and Switzerland excluded due to incomplete data 
Sources:  Thomson Financial; World Bank World Development Indicators 
2.2  Change in the Composition and Behaviour of GDP Components 
It is possible that firms have become more adept at managing demand shocks and 
that this has played an important role in reducing the volatility of output growth. In 
particular, it has been argued that improvements in information technology have 
helped firms to sharpen their inventory management, resulting in less pronounced 
swings in production and output (Dalsgaard, Elmeskov and Park 2002 and 
McConnell, Mosser and Perez-Quiros 1999). Kahn, McConnell and   
Perez-Quiros (2002) argue that the clear downward trend in the US inventory-to-
sales ratio from the mid 1980s (after being steady since the 1950s) is attributable to 
improved inventory management techniques dating from the late 1970s and early 
1980s, such as the adoption of flexible manufacturing systems and just-in-time 
inventory management. However, for Japan the decline in the inventory-to-sales 
ratio is a more recent phenomenon, while Khan and Thomas (2004) show that just-
in-time methods have little effect on output volatility. Moreover, while supply-side 
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factors may have played a role in the declining volatility of inventories, changes in 
the nature of demand may have also played a role. For example, more stable 
consumption would facilitate a reduction in the inventory-to-sales ratio and reduce 
the volatility of inventories. Hence, the role of improved inventory management in 
explaining the decline in output volatility is not entirely convincing (Sill 2004). On 
average across OECD countries, the decline in the volatility of GDP less the 
change in inventories is only slightly less than the decline in the volatility of GDP 
(Figure 4), and indeed for some countries, GDP less the change in inventories is 
actually more volatile than GDP itself (Table 1). 
The shift away from the more volatile manufacturing sector and towards the 
service sector has also been suggested as an explanation for lower output volatility 
in developed economies (Dalsgaard et al 2002). However, this process has been 
underway since at least the 1950s and again it is unclear that it lines up with the 
timing of the shift to greater stability of the overall economy. Indeed, Blanchard 
and Simon (2001) find that changes in composition have not played an important  
 
Figure 4: Average Output Volatility – 20 Selected OECD Countries 
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Sources:  ABS; Thomson Financial; World Bank World Development Indicators 
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role in the decline in output volatility; while the composition of output has changed 
over time, the effects have largely cancelled each other out.5 
We do not directly deal with these possibilities in this paper. First, data limitations 
make it difficult to reliably remove the effect of changes in inventories from GDP 
across all of the countries in our sample. Second, many of the factors commonly 
cited as driving the reduction in volatility of consumption and investment 
(particularly of inventories) may be captured by our explanatory variables.6 And 
third, compositional and behavioural changes in the components of GDP that are 
driven by global changes in technology and preferences will be accounted for 
when we control for possible common trends in the data in Section 4.2. 
2.3  Product and Labour Market Reforms 
The effect of a range of different types of market reforms on output volatility has 
been considered in the literature, though in a somewhat piecemeal approach, and 
largely ignoring labour market reforms. In the case of financial market reforms 
(typically proxied by measures of financial deepening), one hypothesis is that 
greater liquidity allows households and businesses to better smooth their 
consumption and investment in response to income shocks. Working in the other 
direction, however, financial sector reforms could initially be associated with 
significant financial system instability and higher output volatility. Similarly, 
increased international integration of both goods and financial markets can provide 
diversification benefits, but at the same time it can also encourage greater 
specialisation in production, with greater exposure to sector-specific shocks; the 
net effect on output volatility in any given country is not clear. Empirical findings 
based on measures of international integration and financial system depth are 
mixed. Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) find that greater openness to trade and deeper 
financial systems are associated with lower output volatility, while Buch, D￿pke 
and Pierdzioch (2002) and Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) find no such 
relationships, or unstable ones at best. Across OECD countries, there appears to be 
                                           
5  The real share of the goods sector in total value added ￿ which tends to decline over time for most countries ￿ 
was included in the regression analysis of Section 4 (results not reported). However, the coefficient on this 
variable was negative and statistically insignificant, and may have reflected a spurious trend; studies which focus 
on this factor suggest, if anything, the opposite sign (Maccini and Pagan 2005). 
6  For example, Kolev (2005) proposes that a relaxation of credit constraints reduces the value of inventories as a 
source of collateral. 
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a positive relationship between changes in trade openness and output volatility 
over the past 20 years ￿ that is, countries that became more open experienced a 
smaller decline in output volatility (Figure 5 and Table 1). There does not appear to 
be any consistent relationship between trend changes in the extent of financial 
liberalisation and output volatility. 
One aspect of market reforms that has been somewhat overlooked is the combined 
effect of broad-based product and labour market reforms on an economy￿s 
responsiveness to shocks. Aggregate output volatility could fall if reforms 
encourage more efficient reallocation of resources across sectors and across firms 
in response to sector- and firm-specific shocks. Consistent with these, Comin and 
Philippon (2005) present evidence that firm-level volatility is positively related to 
product market competition, and link this to a decline in the volatility of aggregate 
output. However, it is also possible that significant reforms could raise output   
 
Figure 5: Changes in Trade Openness and Financial Liberalisation versus 
Output Volatility – 1983–2003 
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Notes:  Trade openness is proxied by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. Excluding Ireland from 
the linear trend makes it slightly more upward-sloping. Financial liberalisation is proxied by the ratio of 
total credit to GDP. Both variables are based on averages of annual data over the five years ending 1983 
and 2003. See Section 3 and Appendix B for details. 
Sources:  ABS; Thomson Financial; World Bank World Development Indicators 
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volatility in the short-run as productive resources are dislocated from previously 
protected industries/firms, and take time to shift into more productive uses 
(OECD 1997). 
Reforms can encourage greater movement of resources across sectors/firms in a 
number of ways. Labour market reforms can reduce hiring and firing costs, 
including by allowing for more flexible work arrangements. They can also lead to 
increased wage flexibility, providing stronger market signals prompting labour to 
be allocated to its most productive use. Similarly, product market reforms can lead 
to price signals that better reflect profitable opportunities. In these ways, resources 
receive stronger signals of, and are better able to move in response to, shocks, 
allowing for greater dynamic efficiency. The global decline in the level and 
volatility of inflation potentially reinforces this effect by making relative price 
changes more apparent (Bernanke 2004). 
Although shocks leading to cycles in activity will often be of an economy-wide 
nature, they will still encompass idiosyncratic elements. Consider a large negative 
aggregate shock, but with differential impacts across sectors. In a world with very 
limited (short-term) mobility of factors of production, those sectors suffering a 
relatively large negative shock will be left with a relative surplus of productive 
factors. If factors of production are able to move from less productive to more 
productive parts of the economy, the effects of the aggregate shock could be 
mitigated and output might not fall so far. Similarly, during a positive aggregate 
shock, output could be higher if resources moved to those areas benefiting from 
relatively larger gains in productivity and/or demand. Overall, flexibility can lead 
to a decline in aggregate output volatility if the gains of shifting resources during a 
downturn are larger than the gains of shifting resources during an upturn. This is 
possible in the case of decreasing aggregate returns to the mobile factors of 
production, as illustrated in a simple model presented in Appendix A. 
Whether output volatility falls in response to more liberalised markets remains an 
empirical question. A glance at the data suggests that it is plausible: countries that 
undertook more sizeable product and labour market reforms experienced larger 
declines in GDP volatility over the past 25 years (Figure 6 and Table 1). 
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Figure 6: Changes in Product and Labour Market Regulations versus Output 
Volatility 
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Notes:  Product market regulations (PMR) index runs from most (6) to least (0) restrictive. Labour market 
regulations (LMR) are proxied for by days lost per ￿000 employed per year. See Section 3 and Appendix 
B for detailed descriptions and sources. 
3.  Methodology and Data 
This paper uses a fixed-effects panel data regression with output volatility as the 
dependent variable and measures of structural change as the independent variables. 
Data are annual from 1974 to 2003, except for the indicator of product market 
regulation, which is available only about every five years from 1978 to 1998 (the 
early 1980s observation is for 1982). Partly for this reason regressions are run with 
observations over five-year blocks. Output volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP within each five-year block; this and 
other key data are summarised in Table 1 (and in Figure B1 in Appendix B, which 
also includes a description of data sources). Blanchard and Simon (2001) also 
measure volatility according to the standard deviation of GDP growth rates, though 
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they use quarterly data and a rolling 5-year window (in Section 4.1 we test the 
sensitivity of our results by adopting a variant of this rolling window approach).7 
A key innovation of this paper is to examine the role of direct measures of 
economic structure in explaining the volatility of output. We define a direct 
measure as one which is closely tied to the actual regime/structure in place, as 
opposed to an indirect measure, which is a consequence of that regime/structure. 
One direct measure we consider is an index of product market regulation produced 
by the OECD, which provides an internationally comparable measure of the degree 
to which government policies inhibit competition. This index covers regulations 
related to barriers to entry (including legal and administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurship), public ownership, market structure, vertical integration and 
price controls (for more details see Appendix B; Nicoletti et al 2001; and Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta 2003). The index ranges from high regulation (6) to limited 
regulation (0).  
The other direct structural measure we examine relates somewhat loosely to the 
￿effectiveness￿ or ￿strictness￿ of the monetary policy regime, which ultimately 
affects the level and volatility of inflation.8 This is measured by a dummy variable, 
which takes a value of 1 if the regime is deemed to be strict on inflation and 
0 otherwise. As a benchmark, Germany, Japan and Switzerland are assumed to 
have had strict regimes throughout the sample period.9 Monetary policy in the US 
is deemed to have become strict starting from the Volcker chairmanship and 
continuing through that of Greenspan. For all other countries, policy is deemed to 
have been strict during periods when they were either tied closely to Germany 
through membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and later the euro 
                                           
7  Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) examine a measure of GDP volatility based on the standard deviation of the output 
gap. Estimates for Model 1a based on a measure of the volatility of the output gap (constructed by applying an 
HP filter to the log of GDP) produce a similar coefficient for product market regulations (though with a p-value 
of 0.15) and a larger (absolute) and statistically significant coefficient for the monetary policy regime (￿0.88). 
Other coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar. While the average trend across countries of output volatility 
based on the output gap is similar to that based on output growth, it generally displays greater short-term 
volatility within countries. 
8  Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) link different monetary policy regimes to changes in output volatility. They 
distinguish four regimes: the Gold Standard, the inter-war period, Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods. 
However, they fail to find any significant relationship, possibly because their regimes are too broadly defined; in 
particular, the post-Bretton Woods period captures an array of quite different policy regimes. 
9  It could be argued that Japanese monetary policy has not been so effective over our full sample. Even if we alter 
our assumption and deem Japan￿s monetary policy regime to have been ineffective throughout the period, the 
results of the paper are essentially unchanged.  
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area, or following the adoption of inflation-targeting regimes. The possibility that 
the ERM may not have been as effective as other strict monetary policy regimes, 
such as euro-area membership or inflation targeting, is also explored by including a 
separate ERM dummy variable. 
As shown in Table  2, the crude dummy variable measure of monetary policy 
regimes appears to be related to both the level and standard deviation of inflation; 
across all countries, average inflation and average volatility of inflation fell 
substantially when moving to the stricter regime. This is also true of most countries 
individually, with the exception of Sweden. 
Table 2: Monetary Policy Regime Dummy Variable and Inflation 
Pooled results ￿ annual data 1978 to 2003, per cent 
  Less strict regimes 
(Dummy = 0) 
More strict regimes 
(Dummy = 1) 
Total period 
Average inflation  8.0  3.5  4.9 
Standard deviation of inflation  5.2  3.3  4.5 
 
Ideally, we would also include a direct measure of labour market regulations in the 
regressions; however, a useful measure is not readily available.10 Hence, we use a 
proxy based on the number of days lost in labour disputes. This shows a trend 
decline across most countries, which appears to be consistent with the variation in 
the extent of labour market reforms across countries. Further, because the approach 
to industrial relations reform has been quite different across countries, an outcome-
based measure may be better than a direct measure. For example, Wooden and 
Sloan (1998) show that while Australia and the UK adopted different approaches 
to labour market reform, they have resulted in very similar labour market 
outcomes. Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) note that for 1998, there is a 
significant positive cross-country correlation between indices of employment 
protection legislation and product market regulations, suggesting that the latter 
might also proxy for labour market regulations in the regression analysis (the 
                                           
10 The Economic Freedom of the World Index provides an overall measure of labour market regulations. While 
useful for cross-country comparisons, it tends to understate the degree of reform within countries over time ￿ 
indeed, for Australia this measure suggests that the labour market was more regulated in recent years compared 
with the early 1990s notwithstanding significant reform over this period (Dawkins 2000). This may reflect the 
fact that this measure (and others like it) is only able to capture a limited set of factors that determine how the 
labour market operates, and it tends to rely heavily on subjective interpretations of the legal framework. 
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correlation between product market reforms and days lost in labour disputes is 
0.26; see Table 3). 
Other indirect structural measures considered are openness to international trade 
(proxied by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP) and financial liberalisation 
(proxied by the ratio of private sector financial assets or liabilities to GDP). Also, 
inflation volatility can be used as an indirect measure of the effectiveness of 
monetary policy regimes.11 Finally, controlling for any effects due to changes in 
the behaviour of fiscal policy is achieved by including the volatility of the 
cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance (as a ratio to GDP). This measure of 
discretionary policy is preferred over the primary budget balance, which is 
endogenous with respect to output volatility since it includes the effect of 
automatic stabilisers.12 
The distinction between direct and indirect structural indicators is relevant for the 
lag structure in the regressions. For direct measures we match the volatility of 
annual GDP growth over a given five-year period with the value of the structural 
indicator that applies in the year just prior to this (for example, output volatility 
over the five years ending 1983 is matched with the level of the product market 
regulations index in 1978). This captures the likely lagged effect of structural 
change, as well as having the desirable property of ensuring that the structural 
indicators are exogenous with respect to output volatility. In contrast, indirect 
measures of structural indicators are included in the regressions 
contemporaneously, consistent with other studies of this type. Finally, we control 
for one type of supply shock by including the volatility of oil prices 
contemporaneously. 
                                           
11 Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) and Blanchard and Simon (2001) find that the level of inflation is insignificant in 
explaining changes in output volatility.  
12 Commodity price volatility was also examined. The results of Maccini and Pagan (2005) might suggest that the 
coefficient would be positive, in line with trend declines in the volatility of output and commodity prices. 
However, the coefficient estimate is negative (and significant). The inclusion of commodity price volatility 
pushes up the coefficient estimate on product market reform, possibly due to a multicollinearity problem (the 




Table 3: Correlations – Five-year Block Data 
 GDP
volatility 

















GDP volatility  1.00               
Product market regulations  0.25  1.00             
Days lost to labour disputes  0.24  0.26  1.00           
Monetary policy dummy  ￿0.28  ￿0.30  ￿0.46  1.00         
Inflation volatility  0.39  0.42  0.35  ￿0.47  1.00       
Oil price volatility  0.16  0.26  0.38  ￿0.34  0.42  1.00     
Financial liberalisation  ￿0.14  ￿0.45  ￿0.31  0.44  ￿0.43  ￿0.24  1.00   
Trade openness  0.04  0.14  ￿0.19  0.12  ￿0.08  ￿0.03  ￿0.15  1.00 
Volatility of the cyclically-
  adjusted fiscal balance  0.07  ￿0.08  0.07  ￿0.16  0.16  0.02  ￿0.14  0.02 
Notes:  Correlations for the volatility of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance are based on only 90 observations due to missing data for some countries. Product 
market regulations and monetary policy variables are lagged as discussed in the text. 
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In summary the basic regression takes the following form: 
   (1)  20 2,..., 1, for  3 2 1 = + + + + = − i W Z X it i t it it t
Y
it ε α β β β σ
where:   is the standard deviation of annual growth of real GDP for country i; X
Y
it σ it 
is a vector of direct structural indicators; Zit is a vector of indirect structural 
indicators; Wt is a vector of other possible explanators, such as oil price volatility 
and a time trend; and t indicates each five-year block ending in   
1983, 1988,￿, 2003. 
Simple correlations across the panel using data in five-year blocks are generally 
consistent with the graphical analysis in Figures 2, 3, 5 and 6. Most notably, the 
lag of product market regulation is positively correlated with output volatility, the 
lagged monetary policy regime dummy is negatively related to output volatility, 
and a decline in days lost due to labour disputes is associated with a decline in 
output volatility. Greater trade openness is associated with a (contemporaneous) 
rise in output volatility, while financial liberalisation is negatively related to output 
volatility. Volatility in inflation and oil price growth are positively related to output 
volatility. Of the cross-correlations among explanatory variables, the largest in 
absolute terms is the ￿0.47 correlation between the lagged direct measure of the 
strictness of monetary policy and the indirect inflation volatility measure. Looking 
at the correlation between the direct measure of product market regulation (lagged) 
and the three relevant indirect measures, the largest in absolute terms is with 
financial liberalisation (￿0.45) followed by days lost to labour market disputes 
(0.26); the correlation with openness (0.14) is relatively low and positive 
(suggesting that, overall, this measure of openness may not be adequately 
capturing the trend towards lower trade barriers). 
4.  Results 
4.1  Basic Approach 
The OLS estimates of Equation (1) are shown in Table 4. Model 1a is the full 
specification, with two direct structural indicators, three indirect structural 
indicators and oil price volatility as explanatory variables. Of these, only the two 
direct measures are statistically significant; less product market regulations (PMR) 20 
and a stricter monetary policy regime lead to lower output volatility in the 
subsequent five-year period. These results are robust to the exclusion of individual 
countries. Using a general-to-specific approach leads to the parsimonious Model 
1b, with essentially unchanged coefficients on product market regulation and the 
monetary policy regime dummy variables. The inclusion of a separate Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) dummy variable suggests that other stricter monetary 
policy regimes have led to a greater reduction in output volatility. Point estimates 
suggest that adopting the ERM resulted in a 0.3 percentage point decline in output 
volatility, whereas a move to other strict monetary policy regimes led to a larger 
decline of 0.5 of a percentage point. The inclusion of a separate inflation-targeting 
dummy variable suggests that a change to this regime results in a larger reduction 
in output volatility (of 0.4 of a percentage point) than a move to other strict 
monetary policy regimes (0.3 of a percentage point). However, while these results 
are economically meaningful, they  are not statistically significant and are not 
considered in regressions hereafter. 
Point estimates imply that the average decline in the PMR index (from 5.1 to 2.8; 
Table 1) from 1978 to 1998 was associated with a decline in output volatility (from 
1983 to 2003) of almost 0.5 of a percentage point, and that a move to a stricter 
monetary policy regime was associated with a decline in output volatility of about 
0.4 of a percentage point.13 Though statistically insignificant, the point estimate for 
financial liberalisation implies that the average rise in the ratio of credit to GDP (of 
42 percentage points) was associated with a rise in output volatility of about 0.3 of 
a percentage point. Actual average output volatility declined by 0.5 of a percentage 
point. 
                                           
13 The cross-country average change in the monetary policy regime dummy was 0.75 from 1978 to 1998, given that 
some countries were always in the stricter monetary policy regime, while Italy and Norway were still not in the 




Table 4: Panel Regression Results for GDP Volatility – Equation (1) 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1983, the last in 2003
   Model 
        Basic  Fiscal policy   Inflation
volatility 






Variables                Period 1a 1b 2 3 4 5
Direct structural measures              
  Product market regulations  t￿1             
             
            
           
          
           
         
          
            
          
             
0.220** 0.202* 0.242** 0.175* 0.203***
 Monetary  policy  regime  t￿1 ￿0.370* ￿0.346* ￿0.386* ￿0.427***
Indirect structural measures 
  Days lost to labour disputes  t  0.0010 0.0009 0.0013* 0.0009 ￿0.0003
 Openness  t  0.007 0.012 ￿0.013 ￿0.003
 Financial  liberalisation  t  0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009* ￿0.001 0.003
 Inflation  volatility  t  0.184*** 0.185**
  Fiscal policy   volatility  t  0.068
Other 
  Oil price volatility  t  ￿0.001 ￿0.002 ￿0.019***




(d)  0.198 0.192 0.228 0.223 0.168 0.193
Notes:  ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. 
(a)  Fiscal policy data are unavailable for New Zealand and Switzerland, which are excluded from this regression. 
(b)  Regression starts in 1978. 
(c)  Uses annual data and 7-year rolling windows to calculate volatility measures. Other data are annual, with the PMR index interpolated. 
(d) The  R
2 within does not take account of the explanatory power from the constant; the adjusted R
2 for Model 1a is 0.212. 
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Figure 7 illustrates that the Model 1a regression appears to explain much of the 
trend decline in output volatility; but clearly does not capture all of the short-term 
fluctuations in output volatility. This residual volatility appears to reflect a 
common global business cycle, with output volatility typically relatively high in 
the five years ending 1983, 1993 and 2003 (coinciding with global recessions) 
compared with the five years ending 1988 and 1998 (which were periods of 
extended global expansions). Including the lagged level of output volatility in the 
model (results not reported) soaks up some, but not all, of this autocorrelation, 
without changing other coefficient estimates significantly. (Results from using 
individual time dummy variables are discussed in Section 4.2.)  
Model 2 shows the results of controlling for possible changes in the behaviour of 
fiscal policy, as measured by the volatility of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance 
(as a ratio to GDP). The coefficient on this variable is positive, but insignificant. 
Results for the other coefficients are essentially unchanged with respect to 
Model 1a, although that on days lost to labour disputes is now significant.  
Replacing the lagged monetary policy regime dummy variable with the 
contemporaneous measure of inflation volatility provides a slightly better fit of the  
 















data (Model 3 versus Model 1b). While this does not substantially alter the 
coefficient estimates for other variables, the coefficient on financial liberalisation 
is now significant at the 10 per cent level. The positive sign on the financial 
liberalisation coefficient contrasts with the findings of Barrell and   
Gottschalk (2004), but its significance is not robust to the exclusion of some 
countries from the regression (Finland, in particular) possibly reflecting a link 
between significant financial system instability and output volatility for some 
periods in these countries. Model 3 estimates suggest that the decline in average 
inflation volatility of 2 percentage points from 1983 to 2003 was associated with a 
decline in output volatility of about 0.4 of a percentage point.14  
Model 4 uses a set of explanators close to that used by Barrell and 
Gottschalk (2004). We find that the coefficients on our measures of openness and 
financial liberalisation have the same sign as their results, but are statistically 
insignificant. This appears, in part, to reflect our use of data in five-year blocks; 
openness is significant in regressions based on rolling windows over annual data 
(see below), though only when excluding the direct measure of product market 
regulations (results not reported). 
We test the robustness of our results to specifying our dependent variable in terms 
of a rolling standard deviation, in line with Blanchard and Simon (2001) and 
Barrell and Gottschalk (2004). To overcome our product market regulation 
variable being available only every five years, we use a linear interpolation to 
construct data at an annual frequency. Also, because annual data allow greater 
choice of window length over which to calculate standard deviations, we choose a 
length of seven years to better smooth through the business cycle. One drawback 
of using rolling standard deviations, however, is that we specifically introduce 
persistence into our regression, causing moving average errors. In this case, panel 
estimation using ordinary least squares is not appropriate because the assumption 
of independent errors is violated. However, the similarity of the results of Barrell 
and Gottschalk (2004) (who correct for this in their estimates) and Blanchard and 
                                           
14 Model 3 is likely to suffer from endogeneity between inflation and output volatility, which would tend to bias the 
coefficient estimate on inflation volatility. One solution is to use instrumental variables estimation. The results 
(not reported) suggest a slightly higher coefficient on inflation volatility (0.34) and a lower coefficient estimate 
on PMR (0.10) but these variables are no longer statistically significant. Other coefficient estimates are largely 
unchanged. 
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Simon (2001) (who do not) suggests that a correction for moving average errors 
would not affect the results significantly. 
Results using annual data are shown in Table 4 as Model 5. The encouraging 
finding, when comparing Models 1a and 5, is the similarity of the coefficient 
estimates for the direct structural measures ￿ product market regulations and the 
monetary policy regime dummy. One odd result is that the coefficient on oil price 
volatility is significantly negative, which would imply that output volatility 
declines as oil price volatility rises. While oil price volatility is included to account 
for large supply-side shocks, over our sample the volatility of oil prices has been 
quite low and fairly stable compared with the levels of the 1970s.  
Finally, one possibility worth considering is that the model should be specified in 
logarithmic form. Most of the coefficient estimates (not reported) from a fully 
specified logarithmic model are of the same sign as in Model 1a (the exceptions 
are oil price volatility and openness). Only the coefficient on financial 
liberalisation is significant. 
4.2  Controlling for Common Shocks/Trends 
The range of model results above points to a fairly consistent relationship between 
a country￿s output volatility and both the extent of its product market regulation 
and nature of its monetary policy regime. Although the estimation technique used 
above is fairly standard, it fails to account for possible changes in the magnitude of 
common shocks over time. A number of studies that attempt to estimate common 
shocks directly suggest that these have declined over time, and this is certainly 
consistent with the trend decline in output volatility evident in 14 of the 20 
countries in our sample.15 Failing to account for a trend decline in the size of 
global shocks could lead to spurious estimates of the coefficients of the trending 
explanatory variables we examine, including PMR and the monetary policy regime 
variables. While the oil price volatility variable can capture some global shocks, 
there are no doubt other significant supply and demand shocks which are not taken 
                                           
15 Those countries with the highest output volatility in 1983 also experienced a larger decline in output volatility. 
At first glance this might suggest convergence of output volatility. However, closer inspection shows this is not 
the case, with seven countries moving from above to below average volatility, and seven moving from below to 
above average from 1983 to 2003. 
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into account. Without loss of generality, the unexplained innovation to output 
volatility (from Equation 1) can be written in the following form: 
  it t it η κ ε + =  (2) 
where: κt is the common innovation, not already captured by other explanatory 
variables; and ηit is country-specific.  
One way of dealing with trends in common innovations, κt , is to assume that they 
follow a linear time trend. Results of adding a time trend to the basic regression are 
shown as Models 6a, 6b and 6c in Table 5 (Models 1a and 1b are also shown for 
comparison). Model 6a shows that adding a time trend does not change the size of 
the coefficients on either the PMR or monetary policy regime variables, although 
the former becomes statistically insignificant (also true of the trend). Model 6b 
shows that the trend is significant when the PMR variable is removed, though the 
fit of the model is not as good as that of the basic parsimonious Model 1b. Also, 
the trend is not significant in the presence of the PMR variable, even when the 
monetary policy regime dummy variable is removed (Model 6c). In short, the PMR 
and monetary policy regime variables appear relatively robust to controlling for 
common trends by means of a time trend.  
The common innovations, κt, could instead be accounted for by adding time 
dummies to the basic regression (this could also help to account for the apparent 
global business cycle effect apparent in Figure 7). As shown in Model 7a, adding 
time dummies does not alter the magnitude of other coefficient estimates 
substantially, although most variables are statistically insignificant (including the 
time dummies themselves). This is not so surprising since a time trend by itself 
leaves the PMR variable insignificant, and the individual time dummies will better 
match the behaviour of the monetary policy regime dummy variables.16 While both 
the product market regulations and monetary policy regime variables tend to 
behave in a similar fashion across a number of countries over time, this happens 
not to be the case for days lost to labour market disputes, which is now significant.
                                           
16 This matching of the time dummies and monetary policy is exaggerated with the use of five-year block data. 
Using annual data as per Model 5, but with time dummies added, leaves the monetary policy dummy variable 




Table 5: Panel Regressions Results for GDP Volatility – Equation (1) 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1983, the last in 2003 
    Model 
    Basic  Time trend  Time dummies  Good luck 
dummy 
Variables                    Period 1a 1b 6a 6b 6c 7a 7b 8
Direct structural measures                      
  Product market regulations  t￿1                 
                   
                    
                   
                  
               
             
                    
                  
         
           
0.220** 0.202* 0.182 0.208  0.141 0.126 0.202*
 Monetary  policy  regime  t￿1 ￿0.370* ￿0.346*  ￿0.340* ￿0.366* ￿0.213 ￿0.334*
Indirect structural measures 
  Days lost to labour disputes  t  0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0012* 0.0013* 0.0009
 Openness  t  0.007
 Financial  liberalisation  t  0.007 0.008  0.008 0.007 0.008  0.005 0.006 0.008*
 Inflation  volatility  t    0.159***
Other 
  Oil price volatility  t  ￿0.001
 Time  trend        ￿0.019 ￿0.117* ￿0.049     
  Good luck dummy                      ￿0.046 
 Time  dummies  No No No  No No  Yes Yes No 
Number of observations    100  100     100  100  100    100  100  100 
R
2 within    0.198  0.192    0.193  0.179  0.167    0.330  0.359  0.193 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. 
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The point estimate suggests that the average decline in days lost to labour market 
disputes (from 252 to 47 days per thousand employed) implies a contribution to the 
decline in output volatility of 0.3 of a percentage point over the sample. Similarly, 
inflation volatility, which displays greater variation across countries than the 
monetary policy regime dummy variable, is significant in the presence of 
individual time dummies (Model 7b). 
To the extent that the general decline in output volatility might be due to good 
luck, it is not clear that this is best captured by a linear trend, or by the time 
dummies. A third alternative is to include a dummy variable that could better 
capture the possibility of countries experiencing global good luck in the latter part 
of the sample period. Including a single step dummy (with a value of zero for 1983 
and one thereafter) leaves all other coefficient estimates largely unchanged, with 
the PMR and monetary policy regime variables statistically significant. The ￿good 
luck￿ dummy variable is itself statistically insignificant (Model 8).17 18 
It appears that the time trend, time dummies and the good luck dummy variable are 
not especially satisfactory means of modelling common innovations, κt. The 
problem is that while they may capture common innovations, they can also capture 
common trends in output volatility that are the result of common structural 
changes. An alternative is to attempt to remove trends in common innovations 
(unrelated to structural change) by examining relative changes in output volatility 
across countries ￿ that is, by measuring both left- and right-hand-side variables 
relative to a control country or group of countries. One option is to use the average 
experience of the full sample of countries as the control. However, this is 
equivalent to using time dummies (as in Models 7a and 7b). 
An alternative is to use a single country as a control for common innovations. The 
US has been consistently cited in the business cycle literature and elsewhere as 
                                           
17 A similar result holds for a good luck dummy variable beginning instead in 1993. In this case the coefficient 
estimate on the good luck dummy is positive (though insignificant), apparently reflecting the fact that this 
captures two business cycle downturns in 1993 and 2003 and only one business cycle upturn in 1998.  
18 It is not necessary to assume that the timing of this was coincident across all countries. We could allow for a 
once-off shift to a period of good luck for each country coinciding with the break dates estimated by Cecchetti, 
Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2005). Again, using this good luck dummy variable does not alter our basic results; 
the coefficient estimate on this dummy variable is positive (though insignificant). 28 
acting as a ￿locomotive￿ for the rest of the world (Canova and Dellas 1993, and 
Canova and Marrinan 1998).19 In this case the specification would be: 
   (3)  19 2,..., 1, for  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
2 1 1 = + + + = − i Z X it i it it
Y
it ε α β β σ
where: ￿tilde￿ represents the difference between country i￿s observation and the 
equivalent observation for the US, and  USt it it η η ε − = ~ . Estimates for this equation 
are shown in Table 6 as Model 9. Both PMR and monetary policy regime variables 
are statistically significant even when controlling for common innovations in this 
way (results are robust to the exclusion of individual countries from the 
regression).20 The significance of these coefficients (in contrast to the results for 
Models 7a and 7b, which use time dummies) derives from the fact that the pattern 
of behaviour for a number of variables for the US differed from the somewhat 
common pattern for many other countries. This is most obvious for the PMR 
variable, which in the US declined in a relatively consistent fashion throughout the 
sample period, whereas for many other countries the decline lagged the US 
initially, but subsequently declined more rapidly in the second half of the sample 
(Table 1 and Figure B1 in Appendix B). This difference is also mirrored in the path 
of output volatility, explaining why the PMR appears to be a better fit of the data 
than a linear time trend. 
                                           
19 Other large economies, such as Germany and Japan, had significant idiosyncratic shocks affecting their output 
volatility in the 1990s (that is, the effect of re-unification for Germany, and bursting of the asset-price bubble in 
Japan) making them less appealing as controls. 
20 Also, the coefficient on the measure of financial liberalisation is positive and statistically significant, though as 
before, this appears to be driven by a few countries that have experienced a period of substantial financial system 
instability, including Finland and Japan. 
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Table 6: Panel Regression Results for GDP Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1983, the last in 2003
   Model 
    Basic  US is the control 
Variables Period  1a 9 
Direct structural measures      
  Product market regulations  t￿1 0.220**  0.498*** 
 Monetary  policy  regime  t￿1 ￿0.370* ￿0.509*** 
Indirect structural measures      
  Days lost to labour disputes  t  0.0010 0.0005 
 Openness  t  0.007 0.008 
 Financial  liberalisation  t  0.007 0.010* 
Other      
  Oil price volatility  t  ￿0.001  
Number of observations    100  95 
R
2 within    0.198  0.298 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, 
using robust standard errors. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The decline in output volatility in a number of countries over the past few decades 
has been well-documented, though less agreement has been reached about the 
causes of this decline. In this paper we take an atheoretical approach to explain the 
general decline in output volatility across 20  OECD countries using various 
indicators of structural reform, including in the areas of monetary and fiscal 
policies, as well as in product and labour markets. We suggest that reforms in 
product and labour markets can reduce volatility of aggregate output by 
encouraging productive resources to shift more readily in response to differential 
shocks across firms and sectors. 
In contrast to other studies, we include direct measures of product market 
regulations and monetary policy regimes as explanators for output volatility. We 
find that less product market regulation and stricter monetary policy regimes have 
played a role in reducing output volatility, with our estimates robust to a number of 
alternative specifications. We attempt to control for a possible trend in common 
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(unexplained) innovations to output volatility, including a possible decline in the 
magnitude of global shocks. The coefficient estimates on the product market 
regulations and the monetary policy regime variables are robust to controlling for 
trends in common innovations by including a linear time trend, a ￿good luck￿ 
dummy variable, or by examining the behaviour of output volatility across 
countries relative to the US. These coefficient estimates are less robust to the 
inclusion of time dummies. This possibly reflects the fact that there is not a lot of 
variation across countries (other than for the US) for these explanatory variables. 
However, in the presence of time dummies, indirect measures of labour market 
regulations (days lost to labour disputes) and of monetary policy effectiveness 
(inflation volatility) are significant, reflecting greater cross-country variation in 
their behaviour over time. Other indirect measures of market reforms, such as trade 
openness and credit to GDP, are generally not statistically significant explanators 
of output volatility. 
Studies that have used structural models to identify various demand and supply 
shocks find that most of the decline in output volatility is due to a decline in the 
magnitude of shocks, with a limited role for structural reforms and monetary 
policy. In comparison, our atheoretical approach accounts for the possibility that 
smaller shocks may themselves be the result of structural changes. The finding of a 
significant role for increased efficacy of monetary policy and less regulated 
markets in explaining the trend decline in output volatility across a wide range of 
developed economies has an important implication for future output volatility. 
Namely, while any decline in global shocks that has been driven solely by good 
fortune cannot (by definition) continue indefinitely, the benefit of significant 
structural reforms is likely to limit the extent of any future rise in output volatility. 
. 
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Appendix A: Factor Mobility and Output Volatility – A Simple 
Model 
This appendix outlines a simple model that illustrates how output volatility could 
fall in response to reforms that allow greater mobility of productive resources in 
response to differential shocks across sectors. The model has two sectors, labelled 
1 and 2, and labour is the only factor of production. There are two (divisible) units 
worth of labour available. Production functions are identical for each sector: 
   (A1) 
α
1 l A y i i =
where  yi is output of sector i,  li is labour employed in sector i and 0<α≤1. 
Productivity shocks are embodied in Ai, which takes one of three possible values 
depending on three (equally likely) states of the world. In the steady state, Ai is 
assumed to be unity for both sectors, and demand is such that it is optimal to 
allocate one unit of labour to each sector, resulting in aggregate output, Y = 2. In 
the bad state of the world, sector 1 is assumed to suffer a negative productivity 
shock (with sector 2 unaffected), while in the good state of the world, sector 1 is 
assumed to benefit from a positive productivity shock (again with sector 2 
unaffected). For the purposes of illustration, two parameterisations are considered, 
one with constant returns to labour (α = 1), and one with diminishing returns to 
labour (α = 0.7), broadly consistent with the labour share of income. 
Consider two extreme cases of labour mobility. In one, regulations impede any 
transfer of labour across sectors and the allocation remains fixed according to 
steady state levels. In the other, these impediments are removed allowing labour to 
move freely so as to equate the marginal product of labour across sectors, which in 
competitive markets is equal to the economy-wide wage.21 Results are summarised 
in Table A1. 
The main results are as follows. With flexible labour, output is higher under both 
the bad and good states of the world (average output is higher for the case of both 
constant and decreasing returns to labour). However, the comparison of the 
                                           
21 For simplicity, prices of outputs are assumed to be fixed to unity, which can occur if for example both outputs 
are tradable and the country in question is a small open economy. 
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variance of aggregate output across inflexible and flexible labour markets depends 
on the nature of the production function. Under constant returns to scale, the 
flexible labour market case results in a higher variance of output than in the 
inflexible labour market case. In contrast, under decreasing returns to labour, the 
variance of output is less under the flexible labour market case. The variance of 
output in the inflexible and flexible labour market regimes is equivalent at 
reasonably high levels of α (that is, α equal to about 0.86). For α less than this, the 
gains in output during the bad state arising from the ability to reallocate labour are 
larger than the gains in the good state of the world. 
The magnitude of the decline in the variance of output implied by the model 
described in Table A1 under the case of α = 0.7 appears relatively modest, 
especially considering that it compares the extreme cases of no flexibility and 
complete flexibility to reallocate resources across sectors. There are, however, 
likely to be other features of the real world that could act to amplify the impact of 
reforms that lead to more flexible and efficient reallocation of productive 
resources. For example, in reality, extended periods of unemployment can lead to a 
loss of human capital, thereby accentuating the impact of adverse shocks in a 
world where the unemployed are not as readily absorbed by those sectors faring 
relatively better during a downturn.  
  
Table A1: Results of Two-sector Model 
  Productivity  Labour allocation    Total output Average output Variance of output
State of the world  A
1 A  l   
2  l
1 2 Y  Y  Var(Y) 
Constant returns to labour, α = 1                   
No labour market flexibility                2.00  0.67 
 Positive  shock  2  1     
         
         
     
         
         
     
         
         
     
         
         
  1 1  3.00     
 Steady  state  1 1 1 1  2.00     
 Negative  shock  0 1 1 1  1.00     
Full labour market flexibility                2.67  0.89 
 Positive  shock  2  1   2 0  4.00     
 Steady  state  1 1 1 1  2.00     
 Negative  shock  0 1 0 2  2.00     
Decreasing returns to labour, α = 0.7                   
No labour market flexibility                2.00  0.67 
 Positive  shock  2  1   1 1  3.00     
 Steady  state  1 1 1 1  2.00     
 Negative  shock  0 1 1 1  1.00     
Full labour market flexibility                2.32  0.54 
 Positive  shock  2  1   1.82 0.18  3.34     
 Steady  state  1 1 1 1  2.00     
 Negative  shock  0 1 0 2  1.62     
3
3
Source: authors￿ calculations 
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Appendix B: Data Descriptions, Sources and Summary Figures 
Real GDP 
Real GDP non-seasonally adjusted, from Datastream (originally from national 
statistical offices). The exceptions are: Australia ￿ National Income Expenditure 
and Product, ABS Cat No 5206.0; Austria ￿ OECD Main Economic Indicators 
(MEI) sourced from Datastream; Belgium ￿ Banque Nationale de Belgique sourced 
from Datastream; France ￿ Eurostat; Japan ￿ Cabinet Office sourced from 
Datastream, series prior to March 1980 spliced using the old SNA68 framework. 
The following countries￿ series are seasonally adjusted: Canada; Portugal; UK; US. 
All data for which historical data are not available were then spliced on real GDP, 
sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The splice 
dates are: 1974 ￿ Finland; 1976 ￿ Netherlands; 1977 ￿ France and Norway; 1979 ￿ 
Belgium, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; 1985 ￿ Portugal; 1987 ￿ Austria, 
Denmark and NZ; 1990 ￿ Germany; 1994 ￿ Ireland. 
Product market regulations 
From Nicoletti et al (2001). Countries are classified on a 0￿6 scale from least to 
most restrictive for each regulatory and market feature of each industry: airlines, 
railways, road, gas, electricity, post and telecommunications. Dependent on the 
industry, the features covered are: barriers to entry, public ownership, market 
structure, vertical integration and price controls. Aggregate indicators for each 
country are simple averages of indicators for the seven industries. These data are 
separate to the commonly cited economy-wide indicators, which are only available 
for 1998 and 2003 (Nicoletti et al 1999; Conway, Janod and Nicoletti  2005). 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) suggest that reforms in the seven industries are 
representative of economy-wide regulations. 
Working days lost to labour disputes per thousand employed 
Constructed from the number of working days lost (from the International Labour 
Organisation) and the level of employment. The exceptions are: Australia ￿ MEI; 
Belgium ￿ Eurostat; Canada ￿ MEI; France ￿ Eurostat; Germany ￿ data from 1993 35 
from Eurostat; Netherlands ￿ Eurostat; US ￿ MEI. Employment data from OECD 
Economic Outlook, sourced from Datastream. 
Monetary policy regime 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if strict(er) on inflation, 0 otherwise. Germany, Japan 
and Switzerland are assumed to have always been strict on inflation 
(Hyvonen 2004). For others, the strict regime is deemed to begin with entry to 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (or other fixing to Deutschemark; Artis and  
Lee 1994; Eichengreen 1997; Hyvonen 2004; Kenen 1995; Liebscher 2005), euro-
area membership (in 1999) or adoption of inflation targeting (IT): Australia ￿ IT 
adopted in 1993 (Stevens 2003); Austria ￿ in ERM 1995￿1999; Belgium ￿ in ERM 
1979￿1999; Canada ￿ IT adopted 1992; Denmark ￿ in ERM 1979￿1992, 1992￿
1998 fixed exchange rate against Deutschemark (Andersen 2000); Finland ￿ IT 
from 1994￿1999; France ￿ in ERM 1979￿1999; Ireland ￿ in ERM 1979￿1999; 
Italy ￿ in ERM 1979￿1992; Netherlands ￿ in ERM 1979￿1999; NZ ￿ adopted IT in 
1990; Norway ￿ adopted IT in 2000; Portugal ￿ in ERM 1992￿1999; Spain ￿ in 
ERM 1989￿1994, adopted IT from 1995￿1998; Sweden ￿ adopted IT in 1995; UK 
￿ in ERM 1990￿1992 (Nelson 2000 and Hyvonen 2004), adopted IT in 1993; US ￿ 
1979 Volcker disinflation (Bordo and Schwartz 1997). 
Inflation 
Based on the Consumer Price Index (from the WDI). Exceptions are for Australia ￿ 
CPI less interest charges prior to the September quarter 1998 and adjusted for the 
tax changes of 1999￿2000 (RBA calculations) and Germany, which is sourced 
from the national statistics office via Datastream. 
Oil price volatility 
From 1982, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices expressed in SDRs, 
sourced from Bloomberg. Earlier data reflect the IMF measure of oil prices (from 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS)). 
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Financial liberalisation (ratio of credit to GDP) 
Domestic credit, claims on private sector, from national sources and the IFS. 
Exceptions are: Australia ￿ total credit, sourced from RBA; Canada ￿ total 
household and business credit; France ￿ loans to private sector; NZ ￿ total private-
sector credit; Norway ￿ credit to households; UK ￿ bank and building society 
lending; US ￿ liabilities, credit market instruments. Domestic credit to private 
sector, sourced from the WDI, was spliced onto these when historical data were 
unavailable. Splice dates are: 1985 ￿ Portugal; 1987 ￿ Austria, Belgium and NZ. 
Nominal GDP data are from national statistics offices via Datastream. The 
exceptions are: Australia ￿ National Income Expenditure and Product, ABS Cat No 
5206.0; Belgium ￿ Banque Nationale de Belgique sourced from Datastream; 
Finland ￿ Eurostat sourced from Datastream; Germany ￿ Deutsche Bundesbank; 
Japan ￿ Cabinet office sourced from Datastream; Switzerland ￿ Seco State 
Secretariat-Economic Affairs. 
Openness (ratio of exports and imports to GDP) 
Trade data, sourced from the OECD Economic Outlook ( EO). Exceptions are: 
Australia ￿ National Income Expenditure and Product, ABS Cat No 5206.0; France 
￿ national statistics office; Germany ￿ Deutsche Bundesbank; UK ￿ national 
statistics office; US ￿ Bureau of Economic Analysis. Nominal GDP data sourced 
from  EO. The exceptions are: Australia ￿ National Income Expenditure and 
Product, ABS Cat No 5206.0; Austria ￿ national statistics office; Canada ￿ national 
statistics office; Germany ￿ Deutsche Bundesbank; Portugal ￿ national statistics 
office; Sweden ￿ national statistics office; UK ￿ national statistics office; US ￿ 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Fiscal policy 
Cyclically-adjusted government primary balance as a percentage to GDP. Sourced 
from EO. 
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Figure B1: GDP Inflation Volatility (in percentage points), Product Market 
Regulations Index, and Monetary Policy Regime Dummy, Five-year Block 
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